Guns of Fortune: How Guns Move to Fulfill Demand by Coates, Michael J
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Senior Honors Projects Honors Program at the University of Rhode Island
2013
Guns of Fortune: How Guns Move to Fulfill
Demand
Michael J. Coates
Michael James Coates, Azhain@my.uri.edu
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog
Part of the American Politics Commons, Models and Methods Commons, and the Political
Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program at the University of Rhode Island at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Senior Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Coates, Michael J., "Guns of Fortune: How Guns Move to Fulfill Demand" (2013). Senior Honors Projects. Paper 316.
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/316http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/316
   
2013 
Guns of Fortune 
HOW GUNS MOVE TO FULFILL DEMAND 
MICHAEL J. COATES 
Introduction 
No industrial country in the world comes close to America in firearm homicides; the 
U.S.’s closest competitors enjoy a rate less than one-third of ours.1  Despite this fact, gun 
ownership retains a unique political status in American culture.  Gun manufacturers have 
federally granted immunity against civil lawsuits as a result of crimes committed with their 
products, an unusual and advantageous legal protection representing the strength of their industry 
in public policy.  Because of the unwillingness of the American federal government to engage 
the topic of gun ownership, states are powerful vehicles of firearm regulation.  Experimentation 
in gun law has allowed substantial analysis to examine the effectiveness of individual regulatory 
policies for firearms, and the results have been mixed.   
Gun Regulation and Gun Violence 
 The overall prognosis for controlling gun violence has not been positive.  Studies in the 
past have examined the overall effectiveness of regulation on gun violence and determined that 
the best predictors of gun violence are consistently socioeconomic indicators like alcohol 
consumption, unemployment and poverty, rather than local gun laws.2   
Studies have found that stricter gun laws are not correlated with lower gun violence.  One 
possible explanation for the inability to control gun violence is the sheer size of the American 
gun stock, commonly estimated to be around 350 million guns.3  The overwhelming availability 
of guns in America means that no matter what laws are passed to curb ownership, it is nearly 
impossible to remove guns from circulation. 4    
However, firearms (both illegal and legal) are not uniformly distributed across the United 
States.  Some work has investigated the connection between local gun markets to prevalence of 
violence.  For instance, the proportion of gun-related homicides has been found to be a useful 
indicator of gun availability across small areas such as neighborhoods.  However, the proportion 
for other types of gun-violence like suicide and accidental discharges are less effective at 
indicating local gun stocks, even on the micro level.5   
 At least one study has examined gun regulations on a state by state basis and been able to 
provide evidence that a state’s overall attitude towards gun control has a more important and 
measurable effect on gun violence than any individual law.  This can represent the cumulative 
effect of multiple laws directed towards the same end, but it can also be an indicator of the level 
of ‘seriousness’ a state has towards gun regulation.  Even then, socioeconomic factors continue 
to be the ruling predictor of violence.6  
Decentralization Theory and Market Adaptation Theory 
This study is an attempt to explore if piece-meal regulation fails because of the U.S.’s 
nationalized system of commerce.  Decentralization theory argues that local decision making is 
superior to a centralized authority because local institutions hold a more specific understanding 
of local preferences and needs.7  With regards to firearm regulation, local legislative bodies are 
more acutely aware of specific problems affecting their states and likewise are more aware of 
available solutions capable of solving those problems, namely how to affect the prevalence of 
local gun violence.  Or as Howard Dean put it, “It is unreasonable to apply laws that may be 
necessary in California to rural states like Montana or Vermont.”8 
Empirical evidence testing decentralized policies has not always bore out the assertion 
that “local is better”.  In an analysis of 87 countries from the 1970s through 1980s, no 
relationship was easily discernable between decentralization and level of inflation, customarily a 
measure of effective monetary policy.9  However, the same analysis did note that 
decentralization does tend to “lock in” economic status by preventing change through the 
prevalence of additional veto players.  For gun laws, this can explain why national gun control 
policies might be so slow to change.  The existence of multiple levels of actors capable of 
stepping in to stop gun regulation on the national stage “locks in” the current status quo and 
creates resilience to change.  It is important to note that this analysis did not discover a clear 
answer for whether decentralization leads to better policy, just that whatever policy is in place is 
slow to change and adapt. 
Another crucial critique of decentralization is the relative stability inherent in a central 
authority over various regions of a territory.  Regions tend to be specialized and decentralization 
is a barrier to regions working together to ensure overall strength rather than local prosperity.  
Regional disparities are unlikely to be addressed through strictly local means because severe 
problems are increasingly unlikely to be the result of strictly local factors.10  For instance, 
invasive species of flora and fauna cannot be controlled simply through the actions of a local 
government, because these species are inherently nonlocal.   Controlling how invasive plants and 
animals are transferred to places ill-suited to combat them requires cooperation between regions 
when the incentive to cooperate is not universally distributed.11 
For the purposes of this analysis, gun violence can be viewed as simply a disparity 
between states.  Because gun policy is so decentralized, states encounter a natural barrier to 
addressing the disparity of gun violence within their local territory.  Local policy making does 
not naturally include concern for the effects on your geographic neighbors.  There is no inherent 
incentive for a state to cooperate with its neighbors if its local laws have a deleterious effect on 
them.  A centralized authority is better equipped to realize the national consequences of a state’s 
local laws, and pass universal policy which more evenly distributes the burden of regulation. 
This study argues that overreliance on decentralization of gun control policies 
marginalize local decision makers, preventing local laws from producing the desired outcomes of 
regulation because of the policies of their neighbors. With regard to gun regulation, states with a 
strong desire to control gun ownership because of prevalent violence will have their efforts 
undercut by the policies of neighboring states. 
The prevailing mantra of decentralization theorists, and indeed many politicians, is to ‘let 
the states decide’.  They argue that local governments are more capable of understanding the 
unique needs of their constituents, and are better equipped to address them.  In some important 
cases, decentralized policies have been shown to have a significant impact on public health, most 
notably in decreasing infant mortality.12  However, on public health campaigns reliant on public 
education, decentralized paths to legislation often lead to fragmented policies lacking an overall 
effective message necessary for impacting national public health.13  Additionally, on issues of 
unique national consequence, decentralized policies have been found to undermine the ability of 
states to secure their own interests.  Environmental protection policies require a large degree of 
agreement and cooperation amongst regional interests to ensure even the protection of local 
resources, and states have been unwilling to continue these policies when centralized authority is 
not present.14   
 This study puts forward the idea that the nature of markets have changed significantly 
enough that regional separation is no longer a sufficient barrier to market spillover.  Regional 
markets are no longer capable of being controlled by local regulations, because they are no 
longer separated from each other. 
 Market adaptability to gun regulations relies on key assumptions about guns in the United 
States.  Primarily, that there is a restrictive quality inherent to gun regulations that is as important 
to your ability to participate in the market as prices.  Indeed, the main mechanism by which laws 
overcome individual desire for controlled products is restriction of access.  Market adaptability 
assumes that policy makers have basic competence in crafting regulations capable of restricting 
access locally.  If a law is passed in a state restricting access, it will be harder to obtain those 
products legally. 
 Additionally, this theory assumes that access restriction does not impact demand.  
Demand for a specific product, in this case firearms, is not lessened through restricted access to 
those products.  Personal desire for a weapon is not related to the realities of whether or not it is 
possible to legally obtain one.  The characteristics of the market, which may be socioeconomic, 
determine local and regional demand for firearms, regardless of access.15  In fact, regulation only 
goes so far as to create an artificial supply problem. 
 Finally, the United States employs a unique interstate commerce system that is relatively 
free from regulation enforcement across state lines.  It is remarkably easy for citizens of one state 
to travel across borders and participate in competing markets.  This can be as simple as driving to 
a neighboring town to buy goods at a slightly cheaper price, or making longer treks across state 
lines to buy products not available locally.  In cases where consumers feel the need to 
circumvent the supply problem, the supply problem often was an artificial creation as a result of 
regulations.  Differences in taxation on gas between states may encourage savvy consumers to 
travel significant distances for better prices.  Likewise, in states which outlaw firework sales, 
consumers are quick to look for loopholes, or to travel to neighboring states in which they are 
legal.16  These are examples of consumers effectively circumventing artificial supply problems in 
order to obtain desired goods.  What makes this system relatively free from regulation 
enforcement is that states do not set up check points at the border to ensure residents can’t bring 
back undesirable products nor do they have in place ‘tariffs’ for buying goods out of state which 
may recover lost tax revenue from circumvention.   
 These assumptions about economic realities for gun control serve as a capable 
explanation for why regulation has so far been unable to reliably and convincingly decrease 
violence.  Areas of high demand for weapons may be a symptom of the various socioeconomic 
conditions that have long been associated with gun violence, but gun laws are restrictive.  But 
while gun laws are restrictive on the local level, the market reality is that the United States no 
longer has what can be universally referred to as regional markets with capable barriers to 
participation.   
Measurable Expectations 
 Market adaptability assumes that demand for weapons should be a constant force 
unaffected by restrictive access, and should therefore change very little as associated with a local 
legislative agenda.  However, the reality of participation in a national market, as opposed to a 
local one, means that demand for weapons can be satiated regardless of local regulation.  Access 
is therefore not actually restricted and instead is manifested as an artificial supply problem. 
 This means there should be a measurable movement of guns across state lines that are 
consistent with regulations.  Those states with stronger gun laws should reliably import guns 
from states with weaker laws.  This is prescient on the existence of an artificial supply problem 
which encourages savvy consumers to meet unaffected demand.   Such a reliable correlation 
would be significant evidence that local markets consistently adapt to local regulations to obtain 
products they have demand for.   
Hypothesis 
 By collecting data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and 
comparing a state by state analysis for overall regulation of firearms, market adaptability predicts 
that the overall traffic of guns should flow from unregulated states to strongly regulated states.  
The less regulated a state is with regards to firearms, the higher their ratio will be of guns 
exported over imported.  Likewise, the more regulation a state has, the lower the same ratio will 
be. 
Data and Methodology 
 In order to test the assertion that local regulations impact the amount of trafficking a state 
experiences, careful attention must be paid to the collection of appropriate indicators.  Along 
with the actual amount of guns trafficked and the strength of gun laws over time, additional data 
was collected on a number of variables in an attempt to identify possible spurious correlations.  
These additional variables include the total population for each state and the percentage of 
urbanization, the size of each state, and the rate of violent crime.   
Luckily, data on the amount of gun trafficking occurring between states is relatively easy 
to determine.  Since 1968, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives agency 
(ATF) has been empowered to trace firearms taken from crime scenes to their point of purchase.  
Since 2006, the ATF has made publically available its reports on traces for each state, including 
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.17  These reports are presented in the form of maps 
showing the point of purchase for weapons traced from the scene where it was collected.  These 
maps were then analyzed and entered into the database.  From this data each state’s Export Ratio, 
the ratio at which guns are exported to other states versus imported, was collected.  The higher a 
state’s export ratio, the more guns they exported; ex. An export ratio of 3.0 means the state 
exported 3 guns for every 1 gun it imported. 
The only observations excluded from the ATF data is North Dakota in 2007 which 
experienced a spike in export trafficking of almost 500%, and Hawaii.  Because North Dakota 
experiences such a small number of traces every year, the North Dakota trace from 2007 should 
be excluded as a small increase in firearms exports drastically changes the overall export ratio.  
Hawaii was excluded because it enjoys significant barriers to trafficking that no other state has, 
namely over 2000 miles of Pacific Ocean.   
In order to define the strength of gun laws on a state-by-state basis, information was 
collected from the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.18  Since 2007, the Brady 
Campaign has collated a “scorecard” for each state based on their gun laws.  This study utilizes 
those scores with some caveats.  As the Brady Campaign has evolved their political agenda 
through the lifespan of their scorecard, they have changed some of the laws that they track and 
occasionally have reweighted the scores of individual laws based on their supposed strength in 
preventing gun violence.   
Instead of using the raw score provided by the Brady Campaign, this study has 
reweighted all past years of the scorecard to its 2011 equivalent, and dropped any law from 
tracking which has not been tracked over the entirety of the period.  As a result, while the 
original score was out of 100, the reweighted scores have a maximum of 84.  The intended result 
is that a state should have the same score in 2011 as it had in 2007 if no changes in the law 
occurred.  This is to protect the analysis from being skewed by changes in the scoring standard 
over time. 
The violent crime rate was taken directly from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI) website.19  The Census Bureau was able to provide statistics related to the total 
population20 estimates for each state across the 5 years examined in the study, as well as the rate 
of urbanization.21  The Census also provided the official statistics related to the size, in miles, of 
each state.22 
 With this data, a cross sectional time series analysis was used to determine the rates of 
change over time as a result of each variable’s impact on the export ratio.  These results are 
standardized from 0 to 1, and represent the total measured changed as a result of each variable on 
the export ratio.  From the analysis we can see that the strongest variables impacting the 
trafficking of firearms from state-to-state are the Weighted Score of firearm regulations, the Size 
of the state, and the export ratio lagged against itself.   
 The strongest association is between the export ratio and its lagged result.  This is an 
expected occurrence, and may represent the established networks of gun trading which have long 
existed.  Purchasers of weapons with the intent to resell them may utilize the same “routes”, gun 
shows consistently show up to the same places every year, and gun stores are opened along the 
border of strongly regulated states.  As a result, the previous year’s rate of trafficking is very 
highly correlated with the next year. 
 Of paramount importance to this study’s hypothesis, when controlling against all of the 
other variables present in the analysis, the weighted score of a state’s gun laws have a 
statistically significant impact of 6%.  For comparison, the only other statistically significant 
relationship measured is a 4% change as a result of state size.  This means that the overall rate of 
change for firearm trafficking is more greatly impacted by the strength of gun regulation, than by 
the physical reality of state size.   
 In this analysis, the other three tracked variables were not found to have a statistically 
significant relationship to gun trafficking.  This shows that assumptions predicting that the ratio 
of urbanized population may be driving demand for weapons, and therefore the trafficking rate, 
do not have enough evidence to confirm.  This same conclusion can be reached about both total 













Number of Guns Sent to Other States vs. Received 
From Other States 
Variable Coefficient 
Number of Guns Sent – 
Lagged 
.84* 
Weighted Gun Law Score -.06* 
Percent of Urban Population -.02 
Total Population .03 
State Size  -.04* 
Violence Rate .02 
* = Statistically Significant to .05 
Conclusions 
The results of this analysis represent a strong bed of evidence to support the theory that 
state borders are permeable, and relying strictly on state laws to decrease the prevalence of gun 
violence is woefully ineffective at driving results.  Additionally, the results show that overall, 
trafficking is remarkably resistant to changes in the geopolitical landscape, and that without 
generous attention to nationally proposed changes, the current sources of firearms will likely 
continue to help other states circumvent their artificial supply problems.   
When thinking about how to generalize the results of this study, it is possible to consider 
any public policy that is left up to the states to individually decide.  States that make it more 
difficult to get an abortion may see their citizens travel across borders to seek medical 
procedures prohibited locally, a particularly unfortunate realization because it simply ensures 
that poor women will unequally bear the brunt of policy.  We have likewise seen similar 
“consumer migrations” as a result of same-sex marriage becoming legalized one state at a time.  
We can also hazard a guess at how the legalization of marijuana in Washington and Colorado 
may impact the trafficking of drugs to states which prohibit them.  It is important to keep in mind 
how overreliance on state-by-state legislation may undermine issues of national interest.   
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